‘Mheshimiwa Mtarajiwa’

Between April and May 2026, Liberty Sparks combed social media for Kenyans under 38 declaring interest in MCA and MP seats, as part of Mtarajiwa Rais, a youth political leadership programme ahead of the 2027 elections. A social media scan is not a census, but as a signal of who is entering the market for political power, and who is being priced out, it is hard to ignore.

Through the Mtarajiwa Rais project, implemented by Liberty Sparks with support from Alumni for Liberty, we engaged aspiring leaders in preparation for the 2027 elections. The programme sought to encourage ethical, issue-based and policy-driven leadership. As we examined political conversations and interacted with aspirants, several observations emerged that deserve attention beyond the programme itself.

As Kenya moves towards the 2027 General Election, the question should not simply be how many young people will contest for elective positions. We should be asking what kind of political system they are entering, what barriers they face, and whether our democracy rewards competence, ideas and service, or wealth, ethnic arithmetic and social conformity.

Women were Missing

Outside the reserved Woman Representative seats, very few women, as of late May 2026, had declared for MCA or MP when a huge number of males was already campaigning. Either they were not vying, or the conversation did not include them.

A disclaimer is that this was not a representative survey of all aspiring candidates, and social media visibility is not the same as actual political participation. Nonetheless, only 16 women visible met our flexible age criteria with 9 applying and joining the program against over 100 prospective men, 55 of whom applied and got into the Mtarajiwa Rais program. This observation raised an important question on what made women less visible in the competition for ordinary constituency and ward seats.

Based on the 2022 elections, the record agrees with the scan. In 2022, women won 29 of 290 constituency seats and about 8 per cent of ward seats accounting for 115 seats. They hold 23 per cent of the National Assembly and the two-thirds gender principle in Article 81(b) of the Constitution remains unimplemented sixteen years after 2010.

Only 207 women were gazette as candidates for the National Assembly in 2022, 359 for the women representative, 1136 for the member of county assembly, 44 for the senatorial, and 22 for the gubernatorial positions. Thus, women made up about 11% of the total candidates gazetted and now hold 201 of the 1882 elective seats representing a paltry 10.6% up from 9.1% in 2017. Worryingly, only 6% of the parliamentarians, 5 senate, 3 MPs, and 15 women representatives are within the young bracket.

Marital status and Clan Subscription

The question of why an aspirant is not married came up repeatedly, for men and women alike. Singleness was read as a character flaw and proof of unfitness to lead which is an obvious mispricing. Voters are discounting candidates on a signal that has nothing to do with the job. Instead of asking whether an MCA can read a county budget, voters ask whether there is a spouse at home.

For young women the penalty compounds, because researchers have documented that voters already hold women to different standards than men. We must distinguish between legitimate questions about character and arbitrary social expectations as integrity and accountability matters. Having children or conforming to a particular social expectation should not substitute for evidence of leadership ability.

Clan decisions, especially in North Eastern Kenya, emerged strongly. Under “negotiated democracy”, councils of elders’ vet aspirants and settle on a candidate, and women are largely excluded from those councils. A Garissa clan sultan warns that those who defy the elders lose, while a former Mandera East MP calls the endorsement process extremely expensive.

Either way, the electorate often chooses from a shortlist it did not write. Gatekeepers are not uniformly the problem, though. The Isaaq clan’s endorsement of Zamza Ismaili Ali for Isiolo North shows elders can open a door as easily as close it. However, the standard should be consistent, whoever screens candidates must put women and young people in the room.

Money, Tribal Parties, and Misunderstood Mandate

In 2017, the average campaign cost Sh3.1 million for an MCA seat and Sh18.2 million for an MP seat. For a young person without patrons, those are not budget constraints but huge barriers to entry. The spending limits expected heading into 2027 elections for constituencies increased from sh33 million in 2017 to 123 million while the ceiling for wards is sh20 million up from 10.3 in 2017. Party nominations, mobilization, transport, publicity, campaign agents and the expectations of voters all require resources.

“Kenya’s young have the vision and the numbers. What they lack is access. Every barrier above, whether money, clan, party or prejudice, is a restriction on who may compete.”

The Election Campaign Financing Act of 2013 has never been fully implemented. Only now, with the Campaign Financing Regulations, 2026, are limits on the books for 2027, and a sitting MP is already saying that the Sh21 million cap for his seat is unrealistic if you intend to win. Price ceilings that candidates ignore only penalize those who comply. The reform that scales is disclosure that is public, searchable, near-real-time reporting of who funds whom.

A good number could not describe the mandate of the seat they were seeking as they promised bursaries, boreholes, and tarmac. An MCA legislates at county level, oversees the county executive, and approves the county budget as per Article 185, while an MP under Article 95 legislates, represents constituents, and oversees the national executive where neither is a contractor. This gap is not new as a 2012 study found that over 70 per cent of Kenyans could not explain how county governments work. A voter who does not know the job description cannot tell a competent candidate from a generous one, and a candidate who does not know it will promise what the office cannot deliver.

Party loyalty anchored in ethnically aligned parties remains a serious obstacle. The ticket belongs to a political machine, and the machine rewards loyalty and cash more than competence. Young people dislike the arrangement but feel trapped in it. In an academic survey of Kenyan university students ahead of the 2022 election, 84 per cent agreed that tribal identities hurt Kenyan politics more than they help, yet 40 per cent said having a co-ethnic in government mattered to them. A market where a few incumbents control the license is a cartel, and cartels do not reform themselves.

Yet young Kenyans know the country they want

This is the encouraging finding. Even with thin knowledge of mandates and a hostile entry market, young people have a decent idea of the Kenya they want. That vision is the asset as the observation pointed to a gap between the aspirations young people hold and the political incentives confronting them. The IEBC’s post-election evaluation recorded an increase of 788 youth candidates for elective positions, from 3,091 in 2017 to 3,879 in 2022. Yet, youth voter registration in 2022 declined relative to 2017 by 5.27%, illustrating that political engagement cannot be measured by candidacy alone.

The IEBC is targeting a register of about 28 million for 2027, up from 22.1 million in 2022, with 5.1 million of the 6.3 million projected new voters born between 2006 and 2009. More than 1.37 million people registered in the first 18 days of the March to April 2026 drive (IEBC).

The weak link is conversion. In 2022, only 14.3 million of 22.1 million registered voters cast a ballot, and Afrobarometer found that only 42 per cent of youth trust electoral bodies. As candidates, young people fare worse as in 2017, only 314 of 3,428 youth candidates won, under 10 per cent. Ideally, Young Kenyans are customers in this market, they are not yet owners.

What must change

Ahead of 2027, the IEBC should enforce the 2026 campaign finance regulations fairly and publish disclosures in real time. Political parties must establish transparent nominations, free from financial and clan-based gatekeeping. Clan councils should include women and young people in decision-making while civic educators, media and civil society must equip aspirants with a clear understanding of their constitutional mandates before campaigns begin. Ultimately, voters must prioritise competence, integrity and policy proposals over marital status, ethnicity or clan affiliation. Kenya needs leadership chosen on merit rather than conformity or patronage.

Kenya’s young have the vision and the numbers. What they lack is access. Every barrier above, whether money, clan, party or prejudice, is a restriction on who may compete. Remove them, and 2027 can be an election where the best idea wins. Leave them, and 2027 will offer young Kenyans a vote but not a choice.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Liberty Sparks. Liberty Sparks is not responsible for the opinions, claims or statements presented by contributors and guest writers.